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Abstract
Technology is advancing in almost all aspects of our everyday life. One interesting aspect
is the possibility to conduct elections over the Internet. However, many proposed Internet
voting schemes and systems build on unrealistic assumptions about the trustworthiness of the
voting environment and other voter-side assumptions. Code voting – first introduced by Chaum
[Cha01] – is one approach that minimizes the voter-side assumptions. The voting scheme Pretty
Understandable Democracy [BNOV13] builds on the idea of code voting while it ensures on the
server-side an arguably practical security model based on a strict separation of duty, i.e. all
security requirements are ensured if any two components do not collaborate in order to violate
the corresponding requirement. As code voting and strict separation of duty realizations come
along with some challenges (e.g. pre-auditing phase, usability issues, clear APIs), the goal
of our research was to implement Pretty Understandable Democracy and run a trial election.
This paper reports on necessary refinements of the original scheme, the implementation, and a
trial election among the different development teams.
This work is an extended version of the paper Pretty Understandable Democracy 2.0 published at the 6th Interna-
tional Conference on Electronic Voting (EVOTE) 2014 [NFSV14].
1 Introduction
The advance of technology, more and more, impacts our everyday life. Shopping, banking, or
chatting with friends no longer depends on physical presence but may be easily done independent
of time and location by digital means. In recent years, even fundamental processes of democracy
have come into the focus of technological advance. Amongst the most attractive options is the
possibility to conduct elections over the Internet. Since the seminal work by Chaum [Cha81],
many works addressed the challenge of voting over the Internet addressing a broad set of security
requirements, see for instance [LSBV10]. It turns out, however, that most of the present schemes
rely on unrealistic assumptions to ensure security: for instance, the JCJ [JCJ05] scheme relies on
the voter’s platform being trustworthy and the Helios voting system [Adi08] relies on the voter
conducting a complex verification procedure several times. The number of infected computers1
shows that it is not realistic to rely on voters to ensure that their platforms are trustworthy. It has
also been shown (e.g. in [KOKV11]) that in particular with the Helios voting system, verifiability
1According to [Pan14], in 2013 31.53% of all computers were infected by malware
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is not accessible to voters. Furthermore, Olembo et. al [OBV13] have shown that voters do not
even see the need to verify their vote due to their trust mental models.
Code voting – first introduced by Chaum [Cha01] – is one approach that minimizes the voter-side
assumptions. Since its invention several code voting schemes with different advantages and disad-
vantages have been proposed [HS07, JRF09, RT09]. Recently, Budurushi et al. [BNOV13] proposed
a new code voting based Internet voting scheme, Pretty Understandable Democracy (PUD). It en-
sures on the server-side an arguably practical security model based on a strict separation of duty,
i.e. all security requirements are ensured if any two components do not collaborate in order to
violate a corresponding requirement. Furthermore, the authors’ goal was to keep the scheme as
simple as possible. To date, PUD has not been implemented and therefore has only been considered
from a purely theoretical perspective.
Contribution. As code voting and strict separation of duty realizations come along with some
challenges for the implementation process, the election preparation and the vote casting (e.g. pre-
auditing phase, usability issues, clear APIs), the goal of our research was to implement Pretty
Understandable Democracy and run a trial election. In order to implement components by a
rigorous separation of duties, we decided to implement components by group-wise student projects
within a computer science class at the Technische Universita¨t Darmstadt, Germany. In this paper,
we present several improvements and refinements made to the original scheme. Thereafter, we
report on our experience about the implementation of the revised scheme and running a trial
election among the different development teams (each team being responsible for one component).
Structure. The remainder of this work is structured as follows: Section 2 reviews related work in the
area of code voting. Section 3 summarizes the original PUD scheme. In Section 4, we outline the
settings provided to the class. In Section 5, we present several improvements of the original PUD
scheme. Section 6 is dedicated to the implementation process. Section 7 reports on our lessons
learned from conducting the trial election. Section 8 concludes this work and provides guidance for
future research.
2 Related Work
Chaum’s seminal work on code voting [Cha01] has motivated many researchers to build their
schemes upon the same idea [JFR13, JRF09, JR07a, JR07b, JRF10, Hel09, HS07, HSS08]. None of
these schemes follows the distribution of trust as rigorously as Pretty Understandable Democracy
(PUD) does. While some of the proposed schemes do not provide receipt-freeness (hence, a malicious
voter can violate secrecy of the vote) [Cha01, JFR13, JRF09], other schemes build upon dedicated
trustworthy hardware [JR07a, JR07b, JRF10] or single voting servers [Hel09, HS07, HSS08] to en-
sure secrecy and/or integrity of the vote. The Norwegian Internet voting system [iEGT12] also
uses some kind of code voting. While their verification code approach prevents single components
from undetectably violating integrity, secrecy builds upon the assumption of a trustworthy voter
platform [SVK12, KLH13] . The only scheme we are aware of following the distribution of trust
principle as precisely as PUD is Pretty Good Democracy (PGD) [RT09]2. As opposed to PGD,
PUD is tailored towards understandability and therefore real-world applicability.
3 Pretty Understandable Democracy
This section provides a brief overview of Pretty Understandable Democracy (PUD) [BNOV13], its
code sheets, the different entities, and the different phases (setup phase including auditing, voting
phase, and tallying phase).
2It should be emphasized that PGD’s adversary model is stronger because stored-as-cast integrity can be increased
linearly with number of trustees, while PUD allows further conspiracies to violate integrity.
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3.1 Code Sheets
Similar to other code voting schemes, code sheets are distributed using an out-of-band channel
such as the postal service. Furthermore, voters get different code sheets. Different from the code
sheets in other schemes, the PUD code sheet is divided into three parts: The first part consists
of a permuted list of candidates3. The permutation differs from code sheet to code sheet. The
second and third parts consist of codes which are concatenated and used to cast a vote for a specific
candidate. The respective code sheets parts are associated by a shared index. A typical PUD code
sheet is depicted in Figure 1. Note, different from the original code voting approach from Chaum
[Cha01], the code sheet contains one additional code which is used throughout the voting phase to
acknowledge the reception of a valid voting code4.
i i i
Dave d8li 03gh
...
...
...
Bob h68g mlp4
– y7rt 82g5
Figure 1: Code sheet in PUD
3.2 Entities
The voting system consists of five different entities and a variable number of trustees. Their roles
and duties are:
• Trustees (T) generate the election key pair in a distributed manner, i.e. they agree on a public
key and each trustee knows one share of the corresponding key. The underlying cryptosystem
must provide additive homomorphism, hence exponential ElGamal is used. Furthermore, the
key generation process is tailored towards providing a trade-off between secrecy and robustness
[Ped91]. They are involved in the auditing and tallying phase as in both phases information
needs to be decrypted (while this is done in a distributed manner).
• Registration Authority (RA) generates, in the setup phase, the first part of the code sheets,
i.e. the permuted candidate list. During the voting phase, RA is responsible for the election
website.
• Voting Authority 1 (VA1) and Voting Authority 2 (VA2) generate, in the setup phase, the
second and third part of the code sheets. They are also involved in the voting phase.
• Bulletin Board (BB) All data necessary to verify (or audit) is published on the BB. Therefore
all entities except DA have write access and everyone (including voters and the public) have
read access.
• Distribution Authority (DA) has a key role in the setup phase: It receives the different code
sheet parts, put them in an envelope, provides those that should be audited, and distributes
the remaining envelopes to the voters.
There are two further entities involved in the election processes, namely the voter, who is a person
eligible to vote, and the voter’s platform which is used by the voter to cast his/her vote.
3Note, according to [DHR+11] permutations of candidates are in general legally compliant and in particular for
simple ballots such as n out of m candidates.
4In [Cha01], there is one acknowledge code per candidate which might serve to prove an individual vote. Therefore,
a number of schemes propose to only have one acknowledge code per code sheet.
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3.3 Setup Phase
The setup phase consists of the following sub-phases: key generation, code sheet generation, com-
mitting on these code sheets, auditing, anonymizing and distributing them to eligible voters. These
are explained in the following paragraphs.
3.3.1 Key generation.
Trustees generate the election key pair. All authorities generate RSA key pairs for TLS, which will
be signed by a valid CA afterwards.
3.3.2 Code sheet generation.
The generation of the three code sheet parts is done distributively and secretly. Each code sheet part
is assigned to an index to enable DA to put the proper parts in one envelope. For each index, RA
generates a permutation and re-orders the canonical candidate list according to that permutation.
For each index, VA1 and VA2 independently generate random codes for all candidates and the
acknowledge code. All codes generated by one entity have to be unique which is to ensure integrity
and differ for the two entities to avoid confusion. After an authority generated code sheet parts for
all indices, the respective code sheet parts are put in envelopes and their index is printed on these
envelopes. RA, VA1, and VA2 forward their indexed envelopes to the DA. In order to allow code
sheet auditing, more code sheets than needed are generated throughout the code sheet generation.
3.3.3 Committing on code sheets.
Afterwards, RA, VA1, and VA2 commit on the respective code sheet parts by publishing encryptions
(using the election key) of the permuted candidate list (each candidate is encrypted separately) and
the generated codes (all codes per index are encrypted together).
3.3.4 Auditing code sheets.
During the auditing process, indices are randomly chosen by the Trustees. For each announced
index the three code sheet parts stored at DA are opened. Furthermore, the encrypted data for the
specific index is downloaded from the BB and decrypted by the Trustees. The public can verify
that the committed code sheet data and the printed code sheets part match. Audited code sheets
are discarded.
3.3.5 Anonymizing and distributing code sheets.
All remaining code sheets sharing the same index are put into neutral envelopes. These are put in
a box and then shuﬄed. After this anonymization step, the neutral envelopes are distributed to
the eligible voters.
3.3.6 Setting-up the servers.
As RA, VA1, and VA2 are also involved in the voting phase as well as the BB, corresponding servers
are set up. Furthermore, the election register is loaded on RA’s server component and VA1 and
VA2 download the information posted by RA.
3.4 Voting Phase
In order to cast a vote, the voter visits the election website, which is hosted by RA. Afterwards,
the voter authenticates herself using strong authentication such as a national electronic ID. Then,
the voter submits the code, which corresponds to his/her candidate. Referring to Figure 1 if the
voter intends to cast a vote for Bob, he/she submits the concatenated code d8li03gh. RA divides
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these codes into the two respective parts and sends the first part to VA1 and the second one to
VA2 (d8li to VA1 and 03gh to VA2 in the example). Both entities generated their respective
code sheet parts of all voters. Consequently, both authorities are able to deduce for which code
sheet index i at which position p the code part was generated. Both components check whether
the code was used before and whether it is a valid code. If all checks are successfully passed, VA1
and VA2 independently re-encrypt the encrypted candidate for the corresponding code sheet i and
position p (without knowing the plaintext candidate); the encrypted candidate corresponding to
code sheet i and p has been published throughout committing on code sheets step. They both
sign their respective re-encrypted candidate and send this information to the BB. After receiving
this data, BB publishes it and sends each VA1 and VA2 a confirmation back. After receiving the
confirmation, both VA1 and VA2 forward their part of the acknowledgement code to RA, which
concatenates the acknowledgement codes and sends it to the voter. The voter checks whether the
acknowledgement code matches the one on his/her code sheet.
3.5 Tallying Phase
To tally the votes, RA signs the total number of authenticated voters, which have participated in
the election and sends this information to BB and the Trustees. The Trustees request the signed
re-encrypted candidates from the BB. BB returns both list (one from VA1 and one from VA2 with
the voting phase. After this, the Trustees check whether the number of entries in the list matches
the number of authenticated voters. Then they sum up the entries in each list homomorphically
and decrypt both resulting sums in a distributed manner (including correctness proofs for the
decryption). For each decrypted sum, the Trustees solve the discrete logarithm and compare if the
both resulting values match. If so, this value is declared to be the election result. The result is
published on the BB along with the zero knowledge proofs of the correct decryption.
3.6 Security Model
PUD ensures secrecy and integrity (encoded-as-intended, cast-as-encoded, stored-as-cast, and tallied-
as-stored) under the assumption that coercion does not take place, cryptographic primitives cannot
be broken, voters do not forward authentication material due to the strong authentication in place,
and do not fall for phishing. In addition, it is assume that the adversary cannot corrupt more than
one entity from the set of authorities, voters, or voter’s platforms. Given that adversary model,
PUD defends the security requirements against a corrupted voter, a corrupted platform, and a
corrupted authority. A more thorough review of the related work can be found in [BNOV13].
4 Settings
Pretty Understandable Democracy (PUD) has been implemented within a student project as part
of the lecture Electronic Voting in the winter term 2013/14 at the Technische Universita¨t Darm-
stadt, Germany. Students participating in this course had a background in computer security and
cryptography.
4.1 Pre-considerations
Before the course started, it was identified which parts should be realized and which are not re-
alistic within a course exercise. First, we simplified the authentication step during the election
process by simply using the voter’s name instead of a strong authentication method. This pseudo-
authentication could be easily replaced by a strong authentication method like the German elec-
tronic ID card if this or a similar implementation would be used in a real-world election.
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In PUD, any communication between two components is secured by applying TLS. In contrast to
a real-world system, the project management team signed the public key for each component and
acted as a Certificate Authority.
In addition, it was decided that the servers did not have to be protected against hackers etc.. In a
real-world scenario protection against several threats, like denial of service attacks (DoS), would be
necessary but was out of scope for the implementation task. However, for the course, this enabled
the students to use their own laptops.
Motivated by a newspaper report5 we decided to tailor our trial election towards the State Election
(German: ”Bu¨rgerschaftswahl”) of the Hanseatic City of Lu¨beck and implemented the respective
ballot from the last state election. Furthermore, it was decided that 35−40 voters (i.e. all students
and supervisors) should be eligible to vote in the trial election at the end of the semester.
The software development teams were free to choose any programming language, as long as they
are able to provide communication interfaces for the other components. This has several advan-
tages: First, due to the different programming skills within specific languages, students could build
upon their preferred languages. Second, relying on one single programming language could result
in system vulnerabilities due to the compiler. An adversary could corrupt the whole system by
just corrupting the used compiler. By using different programming languages also different com-
pilers/interpreters are used. Assuming an adversary can corrupt one compiler/interpreter just one
component would be corrupted but not the whole system.
For distributed key generation and tallying (see Section 3) we extended an already existing android
app [NKMV13] which was already able to perform distributed ElGamal key generation. For the
Trustees’ secret sharing, we defined a threshold of two out of three.
4.2 Organization
There were several software development teams (each one consisted of 2 to 3 students) while each
team was assigned to one component and one phase. There were the following software development
teams: VA1 -setup, VA1 -voting, VA2 -setup, VA2 -voting, Trustees-audit, Trustees-tallying, RA-
setup, RA-voting. In addition, there were the project management team, the BB team, and the
DA team. Students in the software development team were explicitly told to not copy any code
from other groups to ensure the required separation of duty (SoD).
4.3 Schedule
The lecture started on October 18, 2013. There were two sessions to discuss the PUD scheme. The
group assignment was done afterwards. Correspondingly, the software development part started on
November 5th, 2013 and the trial election was scheduled for February 7th, 2014. Thus, the teams
had about three months time to implement and test their components.
4.4 Project management
The software development teams were asked to send the project management team their component
design, their interfaces and their project schedule until November 15th, 2013. This was done in
order to detect and correct design flaws in an early stage of the development process. As target date
for the first integration test, the project management team proposed January 15th, 2014. During
the development process the software development teams were rather free to organize themselves,
but they were repeatedly asked to report their current status to the project management.
5http://www.segeberger-zeitung.de/Schleswig-Holstein/Landespolitik/Kommunalwahl-2013/
Albig-erwaegt-Online-Wahl
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5 Protocol Refinements
After foundational concepts of electronic voting has been introduced to the students, there were two
lectures on Pretty Understandable Democracy in which the scheme was introduced and discussed
with the students. During these discussions, a couple of improvements have been identified. These
are proposed and discussed in this section.
5.1 Candidate encoding
The original proposal was to encode candidates within one single ciphertext. Due to the fact that
throughout the tallying process, all encryptions are summed up, each individual encryption of a
candidate must also encode null encodings of all other candidates. As a consequence, computing
the discrete logarithm for such a complex encoding results in a computationally-intensive task
even for small-scale elections. Following the multi-candidate punch-hole vector-ballot by Kiayias
and Yung [KY04], our revised scheme encodes each candidate into a separate encryption indicating
whether the candidate is selected or not. Therefore, the revised scheme encodes each candidate into
a separate encryption indicating whether the candidate is selected or not. Therefore C encrypted
blocks are sent where C is the number of candidates. Each block has the form {gx}rpkT where r
is a random number and x is the number of votes for this candidate. If the voter has exactly one
vote this is either 1 or 0. For example there are 3 candidates and the voter votes for candidate
1 and 3. The corresponding encodings are (g1, g0, g1) and the respective encryptions are given
as ({g1}r1pkT , {g0}
r2
pkT
, {g3}r3pkT ). Due to this improvement the necessary number of re-encryptions
is increased to C for each voter. Furthermore during the tallying process 2 · C homomorphic
sums are calculated. To overcome these drawbacks compared to the encoding in [BNOV13] the
tallying performance is improved. The encrypted homomorphic sums for each candidate are given
as gc1 , gc2 , ..., gcn where ci describes the number of votes for candidate i. To solve g
ci the discrete
logarithm problem has to be solved but the number of necessary modular exponentiations to find all
ci is limited to
∑C
i=1 ci ≤ V modular exponentiations where V is the number of eligible voters. This
is solvable by using bruteforce. Compared to up to V · 10(C−1)·dlog10(V )e modular exponentiations
which are necessary to tally as described in [BNOV13] this is a significant improvement.
5.2 Cross-checking indices and positions
Originally, PUD prescribed the following procedure: After RA split the voting code apart and
forwarded the respective parts to VA1 and VA2, VA1 and VA2 independently re-encrypt the
ciphertext related to the specific voting code (over index and position of the voting code). It
turns out that a malicious voter might however prevent the computation of an election result by
submitting code parts that represent different candidates, e.g. on the middle code sheet part, the
voter would chose the code at position 3 and at the right code sheet part, the voter chooses the code
at position 4. In such a case, VA1 and VA2 would re-encrypt different candidates and the computed
homomorphic sum of both authorities would differ. Therefore, in addition to validity checks, VA1
and VA2 cross-check that they obtained codes of the same index and the same position. In case the
code is invalid or a mismatch is detected, VA1 and VA2 log the corresponding request and inform
RA that informs the voter.
5.3 Code length
The PUD scheme builds upon the use of voting codes to ensure the conduction of secure election.
The length of these codes plays a substantial role to the scheme because it directly impacts security
and usability of the scheme. In the final part of this section, we therefore analyze which length
voting codes shall have. In order to have unique codes, for C candidates and V voters, there are
at least (C + 1) · V codes per VA required. To allow a sufficient proportion of the code sheets
to be randomly audited, a factor λ is used. Therefore λ · (C + 1) · V codes are needed for each
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VA. Furthermore, the codes generated by VA1 and VA2 are disjoint which results in a factor 2 of
generated codes6. Therefore 2 · λ · (C + 1) · V codes are needed for both VAs. This means that
log2(2 · λ · (C + 1) · V ) bits are necessary for each code to ensure that all codes are different. For
the trial election, we set λ = 2. The number of candidate was according to the proposed ballot
C = 14 and the number of voters V = 50 (because of the number of participants). This takes
dlog2(2 · 2 · (14 + 1) · 50)e = 12 bits. With Base32 encoding, each code consists of 3 characters.
In order to prevent guessing attacks launched by RA, there must be more characters within each
code. We propose to extend each code by one further character. Note, as 50 voters is a rather
small number, we were interested to study the practicability of PUD for larger amount of voters
(while keeping λ = 2): For 500.000 voters, 25 bits (5 characters) are needed; for 1.000.000, 26 bits
(6 characters) are needed. Even for 5.000.000 just 29 bits (6 characters) are needed. From this we
are able to conclude that code lengths scale well with the number of voters.
6 Implementation
In this section, we explain the programming interface, the different languages in place, the user
interfaces, and the way the prototype was tested.
6.1 Programming Interfaces
In order to ensure a smooth communication between the involved entities, the students agreed on a
REST API to receive and send data. To publish the specific syntax for each command an internal
Wiki was used in which each team documented all available commands for their API. Some students
did never work with a REST API and had to start learning it first.
6.2 Used Programming Languages
As programming languages Python, Java and Scala are used. Both parts of RA and BB are written
in Python, both parts of VA1 and VA2 are written in Java and the DA is written in Scala.
6.3 Election Material and User Interfaces
The election materials as well as the user interfaces were developed in an iterative process, i.e.
members of different teams provided feedback as well as friends not being involved in the process.
6.3.1 Election material
The election material was developed by the DA team in close collaboration with the RA-voting
team. The invitation letter is the same as the interface shown in Figure 5 and an example code
sheet from VA1 is shown in Figure 2.
6.3.2 Vote casting interfaces
There are in total five relevant interfaces. Note, we translated the interfaces for this paper from
German to English. Once visited the election website, information about the Internet voting pro-
cess is displayed (see Figure 3). In order to proceed, the voter needs to click on ’Authenticate
now’. The voter, then, authenticates himself/herself using the interface provided in Figure 4. As
outlined in section 4, the voter only has to write his/her name, rather than authenticate by strong
authentication means.
6To realize this, VA1 could generate only those codes that start with 0 and VA2 respectively generates only codes
that start with 1.
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Figure 2: Code sheet of our trial election.
Figure 3: Welcome interface. Figure 4: Interface to authenticate.
After being authenticated, the next interface displays the election manual (similar to the election
material received together with the code sheets)(see Figure 5). The students decided to provide
this information here again as the vote casting process differs from what voters might expect and,
thus, to ensure that voters who did not carefully read the election material are provided with a
short summary. The voter continues by clicking on ’Vote now’.
The system re-directs the voter to the next interface on which he/she casts his/her vote (Figure 6).
Both codes of his/her preferred candidate need to be provided in the field next to ’Vote’. Spaces
will be deleted by the interface. The vote casting can either be completed by clicking on ’cast’ or
canceled. If the voter enters an invalid concatenated code, e.g. code 1 corresponds to candidate A
and code 2 corresponds to candidate 2, an error message will be returned by the RA. Once cast,
the interface displays the information that the vote has been successfully cast and the respective
acknowledgement code as shown in Figure 7.
Figure 6: Voting casting interface. Figure 7: Interface with acknowledgement.
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Figure 5: Interface with information about the election process.
6.3.3 Bulletin Board interfaces
The BB provides different sectors for all phases of the election process. Every entity has read access
and except the Distribution Authority also write access. All data published on the Bulletin Board
is signed by the publishing authority. For example, throughout the setup phase, commitments of
code sheets are published on the BB (see Figure 8). The announced election result at the end of
the tallying phase is shown in Figure 9.
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Figure 8: Committed and encrypted parts of the code sheets.
Figure 9: The end result of the election is shown on the BB.
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6.4 Tests
To test their components the teams wrote their own test cases and some of them set up test servers
which respond static messages depending on the request with the syntax described in the internal
Wiki. With such servers the teams could also test the communication with other components.
Unfortunately, some teams did not stick to the plan on the first test, which was as announced on
January 15th. Therefore, the final complete test took place at February 6th, 2014, only one day
before the trial election. At the final test some problems occurred, which had to be fixed: The
communication from any component to VA1 did not work because of a TLS error. Furthermore
the tallying module did not work properly because the group did not implement homomorphic
tallying properly. To fix the communication and tallying problems, the students worked until late
night and the whole morning before the trial election.
This experience shows that time schedules are even more important if (voting) systems are developed
in such a distributed manner.
7 Lessons Learned from Running the Trial Election
The trial election was conducted on February 7th, 2014. Assembling all the needed papers (three
code sheets and the election manual) took about 20 minutes (with one printer) for the small trial
election with 50 voters, where ten persons in parallel took care of preparing the voting papers. This
process could possibly be improved by special machines. Even without machines, the process could
be organized in a way that is acceptable as in many German cities the postal voting material is
also prepared manually.
Auditing only five code sheets took us more than 10 minutes. It just takes time to open the
envelopes and read aloud all the candidates, then all the codes from VA1 and then all the codes
from VA2 for each audited code sheet. It even takes more time, if this is done in a transparent
manner, i.e. the present observers can follow the process.
When entering the codes, we noticed that some participants were confused by entering both parts
of the code in the same text field. It might be worth providing two different fields in future and
clearly indicating which code to enter in which field. The different views of the bulletin board
were clear to the participants. However, it was also discussed that in case - due to transparency
requirements - it is assumed that also voters should understand the content of the bulletin board,
further information needs to be provided.
8 Conclusion
The present work reports about the experience of refining and implementing Pretty Understandable
Democracy (PUD) and running a trial election with that scheme as part of a computer science
course. Overall, the implementation and the election have been a success. The insights gained
throughout the implementation and the trial election process are manifold and serve as guidelines
for future research.
PUD has been introduced as a theoretical concept and as such several details remained open. This
gap forms the motivation for the present work. The first refinement is the multiple ciphertext en-
coding of single votes, which reduces the number of modular exponentiations needed throughout the
tallying process significantly. In order to prevent malicious voters from blocking the calculation of
the election result, the voting authorities cross-check the consistency of voting codes. Furthermore,
we analyzed the required lengths of voting for different election settings. Finally, in order to conduct
the trial election as close as possible to real-world elections, we proposed user interfaces tailored
towards the state election of the Hanseatic city of Lu¨beck which currently considers introducing
Internet voting as new voting channel. The contributions of this work builds one step towards
PUD’s real-world applicability knowing that there are many challenges open challenges before its
first usage.
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For the future, we see space for improvements both from the conceptual and from the implementa-
tion perspective. Throughout the trial election, individual code sheet parts had to be combined into
one envelope and sent out to voters. This results in significant organizational and time-intensive
effort. We consider revising the code sheet distribution process, thereby lowering the organizational
effort. Discussions among the students and the staff show that from a usability perspective the
scheme is going into the right direction. In order to evaluate the scheme’s usability in an unbiased
manner, user studies will be conducted in the near future. PUD has been tailored towards a trade-
off between security and transparency. Nevertheless, the scheme builds upon several cryptographic
primitives. We plan to investigate the scheme’s understandability by preparing information and
education material and evaluating it in user-studies.
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